Source : Globe & Mail

If Paul Martin wants to conquer our democratic deficit, he should start with the fact that there's too much power in the PMO, says veteran cabinet insider TOM KENT

Paul Martin has affirmed his dedication to democratic reform with two commitments: "I will loosen the bonds of party discipline in votes on most issues. I will enhance the role of committees."

Similar reforms launched in the Sixties did not come to much. Mr. Martin may do better. The information age provides widening scope for constructive work by backbench MPs. More active committees and more free votes should enliven Parliament, which could strengthen public interest and in turn make participation in federal politics more popular. So far, so good. But there's so much more Mr. Martin can do. As his manifesto stated: "In effect, the command-and-control systems of central authority in Ottawa have pushed the views of citizens and communities to the side."

Conquering the democratic deficit is going to make Mr. Martin's successful struggle against the financial deficit seem like child's play. He himself is now the command-and-control centre. To start democratic reform, to give new weight to the views of citizens and communities, he has only to forgo some of the prime minister's power.

Relations with MPs are a good place to start, and they will be improved by moderating use of the party whip to herd their votes. The whip, however, is merely the instrument of authority in the House of Commons. The font of authority is the prime minister's power to dissolve Parliament when he chooses -- a fearsome discipline over his own party. The even greater offence to democracy is that other parties are put at a serious disadvantage, as they cannot be sure when and on what issue or pretext an election will be called. Will Mr. Martin free Parliament from arbitrary dissolution? That would indeed shift the balance of power, away from the "command-and-control systems of central authority" and toward a representative democracy that better reflects "the views of citizens and communities."

The constitution provides that a House of Commons cannot last for longer than five years. How long, within that limit, should be decided by the House itself, not by the prime minister. That can be done by legislation establishing a fixed parliamentary term -- an act to provide that henceforth every House of Commons would either be automatically dissolved four years from the day its election writs are returned; or be dissolved earlier by the votes of separate majorities of at least two of the parties in the House.

The rigid timing of presidential and congressional elections in the United States is not for us. In our parliamentary system, government requires a majority in the House of Commons. That can be eroded by losses in by-elections, defections, party splits or new alliances. The present convention is that the prime minister can then dissolve Parliament and retain the advantages of office during the subsequent general election. The effect of the proposed legislation is that dissolution with no change of government would require the support of another party. The leader of the opposition would have the chance to show that he or she had enough firm pledges of support for a majority in the existing House. Parliament, not the existing command-and-control centre, would be the master.

If the Prime Minister wants to fulfill his democratic promise, he could also give up his power to appoint senators and instead appoint persons who win an election for the purpose. The electoral organization should be designed for independents; the more broadly representative they are, the more effective senators would be.

Senate seats are only the most conspicuous of a prime minister's patronage appointments. Parliament should have a larger say: A proposed appointee's qualifications can be submitted to an appropriate committee. If, say, four out of 10 committee members consider the qualifications dubious, then the responsible minister could be summoned for questioning (this could be a stronger role for backbench MPs) -- and thus shamed out of suggesting appointments motivated by patronage.

Another proposal: The most important appointments used to be those of ministers -- but for three decades, their significance has been depreciated by inflation of their numbers. Too large a cabinet confuses responsibility and frustrates public accountability. Junior ministers and secretaries are effectively accountable only to the prime minister for their bits and pieces of government activity; they intensify his central command-and-control. Let's hope that Mr. Martin's monstrous administration is temporary and that he trims his cabinet.

Democratic reform also requires change outside Parliament Hill, namely in a changed Liberal Party. Parties are the shapers of public purpose. But the Liberal Party is now less an association of people with public purpose than a centralized machine directed to power for some.

Mr. Martin's predecessor removed the worst offence to democracy: The party and its operatives can no longer run, within the law, on money diverted from the treasuries of corporations by friendly executives. But in order to reconcile reluctant Liberals to the loss of corporate money, Jean Chrétien's legislation had to provide parties with generous public funding. Private funding had the one virtue of being to some extent spread among constituency associations and individual politicians. Public funding will be for party headquarters to share out -- further strengthening central command, unless Mr. Martin prevents it.

The staff and organizers Paul Martin accumulated on the way to the leadership naturally see the party as an instrument to be used rather than an organism to be nurtured. They're skilled at scripting slick presentations, marshalling audiences, enlisting instant members to vote and go away. To revitalize the party, Mr. Martin needs not a multitude of such staff, but colleagues rich in vigorous opinion. Such people are scarce in Liberal ranks; the party itself has turned them off.

To re-make the Liberal Party for democracy, Mr. Martin would have to ensure that more effort is put into policy information and open discussion. The party's constitution would have to change to ensure that constituency representatives and candidates reflect the majority wish of genuine members. Above all, Mr. Martin needs to make clear his own view of his role as a leader but not a boss.

The final step to a healthy democracy is electoral reform. First-past-the-post polling produces majority governments from minority opinions. It was tolerable when parties were open to democratic shifts. It has been brought into deserved disrepute by the Liberal Party's new imperialism.

No Liberal government will willingly reform our electoral system, because it owes its majority to the present system. It is always possible that an election will result in a minority government; NDP leader Jack Layton would be wise to have a precise plan for democratic reform -- legislation that could be the crucial condition on which a responsible NDP would undertake to work with Mr. Martin.

More probably, Mr. Martin will be free to go his own way. His words have roused considerable expectations of democratic change. To fulfill them, he must let go some of the patronage and commanding control now centred in the prime minister's office.

Tom Kent, principal assistant to prime minister Lester Pearson, is now a fellow at Queen's University's School of Policy Studies.

© Globe Information Services